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Abstract: Economic theories of optimism provide different rationales for the phenomenon of 
motivated reasoning, and a recent empirical literature has tested some of them, with mixed results. 
We contribute to this literature with a novel experimental test of two mechanisms, according to 
which optimism is respectively predicted when (1) the potential material losses due to the bias are 
relatively small or (2) the cognitive costs of the bias are small enough. In our design, these two 
accounts predict inflated expectations regarding some future payoff. Contrary to that, the average 
subject tends to (slightly) underestimate that financial prospect. Although a minority of the subjects 
overestimate systematically, the size of their errors is rather reduced, and they hardly differ in their 
personal characteristics from the rest of the subjects. In fact, optimism in our experiment is 
correlated with the sample observed, in that it is more likely when a subject observes relatively few 
good signals. This is again at odds with (1) and (2). These mechanisms, we conclude, do not appear 
to fully capture under which circumstances people fail into a positivity bias. Yet (1) seems to be 
empirically less relevant, in that we observe a similarly limited level of bias irrespectively of its 
monetary cost. 
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1. Introduction   
Numerous studies show that people sometimes have ‘too’ optimistic beliefs about self-
relevant events and future material outcomes, as if their beliefs were influenced and aligned with 
their desires or preferences –for reviews, see Bénabou and Tirole (2016); Epley and Gilovich (2016); 
Kunda (1990); Wicklund and Brehm (1976). When such a positivity bias is observed, further, there is 
strong evidence that it is caused by asymmetric updating, that is, the under-weighting of undesirable 
information relative to the desirable one –e.g., Eil and Rao (2011); Möbius et al. (2011); Sharot et al. 
(2011). Wiswall and Zafar (2015), for instance, report that undergrads update their beliefs about their 
own future earnings asymmetrically: After learning the actual average earnings for each major, their 
original beliefs about self-earnings are slightly revised downwards when their prior estimation of 
average earnings was too positive, whereas the corresponding upward revision is more substantial if 
they underestimated the actual mean value. On the other hand, it is yet far from clear which 
environmental and individual factors make people (more) skewed: People fail into positivity biases, 
but it is not well-known when they do so, and who is more likely to do so.
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Understanding which factors or conditions are more propitious for the formation of optimistic 
beliefs is crucial for at least two reasons. First, these beliefs can motivate suboptimal decisions 
which sometimes may lead to undesirable collective outcomes, as the next examples illustrate. I: If 
people want to believe that they are often right in their presumptions and hence commit few 
mistakes, a confirmation bias follows. That is, agents underweight disconfirming evidence and 
overweight confirming evidence, e.g., Eil and Rao (2011). As a result, voters may develop partisan 
biases and polarized beliefs on issues such as climate change (Sunstein et al., 2016), as well as a 
higher credulity for fake news in line with their prejudices. II: Optimism may lead to overinvestment 
during economic booms and boost the formation of financial bubbles (Aliber and Kindleberger, 
2015; Shiller, 2000). As an illustration, a few years before the subprime mortgage crisis, a survey 
conducted by Case and Shiller (2003) to new homeowners in different cities in the US showed that 
90 percent of them believed that housing prices in their cities would keep increasing for the next 10 
years at an average estimated rate between 9 and 15%, depending on the city. III: Oster et al. (2013) 
study testing among individuals at risk for Huntington disease –a degenerative neurological disorder 
associated to a genetic alteration. One of their main findings is that those who reject testing generally 
underestimate their actual risk and behave as if they do not have the disease, even when diagnosed 
individuals behave differently (for example, they are more likely to retire, make major financial 
changes or change their recreation habits). More speculatively, but also in the public health realm, 
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 A similar point has been stressed by Benjamin (2019) in his comprehensive review about biases in beliefs. 
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many government’s initial reaction (or lack of it) to the Coronavirus threat in January-February 2020 
suggest some optimism –e.g., the virus will not arrive, and hence there is no need to buy in advance 
enough personal protective equipment for the healthcare workers in the public hospitals in case it 
comes.  
Second, there is also a positive side of optimism. Beliefs about the future, the morality of our 
acts, or about oneself can trigger different emotions like hope, pride, anxiety, guilt, or shame. In this 
sense, individuals may prefer information and beliefs that contribute to emotional well-being. In fact, 
optimism has been associated to a good mental and physical health (Rasmussen et al., 2009; Strunk 
et al., 2006). Also, optimistic beliefs about one’s abilities can motivate the individual to undertake 
difficult tasks and to overcome the obstacles that can arise (Bénabou and Tirole, 2002, 2004). 
Further, self-confidence can also help to convince others (von Hippel and Trivers, 2011). To sum up, 
optimism has arguably cons and pros and, depending on the context, we may wish to deter or 
promote such bias. That requires, however, a precise understanding of the environmental, individual, 
and institutional conditions leading to more optimism (or more realism).   
In this endeavor to find answers for the when and who questions cited above, models are 
invaluable tools, as they offer insights, allow precise policy design, and organize the analysis. 
Several economic theories of optimism have been proposed, and they give different answers to those 
questions. Our goal here is to test the predictions of two families of theories by experimental means. 
A common hypothesis in all these models is that individuals have implicit preferences over the 
possible states of nature and derive utility (disutility) from thinking that their preferred state is (not) 
true. If people experience anticipatory feelings like excitement, joy, fear or anxiety from thinking on 
some future uncertain events, for instance, they would rather believe that the future will be favorable, 
so as to trigger the relatively more positive emotions. Another idea common to these models is that 
human inference operates as if people chose their beliefs, although most likely trough a subconscious 
mechanism. This means that belief acquisition responds to incentives and constraints, as in a usual 
economic decision like, e.g., buying some good. The families differ mostly in the specific factors that 
restrain optimism and prevent individuals’ beliefs from departing too much from reality. In models 
like Akerlof and Dickens (1982) and Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) –AD and BP henceforth, 
respectively–, the ‘demand’ for a biased belief depends on its material price: If biases lead to 
sufficiently costly or risky decisions, individuals may be more reflective, cooling down their 
expectations. In Rabin (1994) and Bracha and Brown (2012), alternatively, self-deception requires 
the individual to selectively avoid or look for information, to rationalize it or to restraint certain 
thoughts. To formalize this idea, these models explicitly incorporate cognitive costs associated to 
belief distortion, which increase the further away from Bayes’ rule the beliefs are. 
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While there is plenty of evidence of situations in which individuals seem to be optimistic, the 
specific implications of these models have received much less attention. As Coutts (2019b, p. 549) 
notes, “rigorous tests of existing theory and direct evidence about optimism are scarce”, and the 
evidence collected so far is not conclusive (see Section 2 below for a review). This paper hence 
contributes to this literature with a lab experiment. On the adequacy of this methodology, we note 
that, while field studies offer extremely suggestive evidence from a naturalistic setting, they can 
rarely offer full control of the agents’ relevant priors and evidence observed. As a result, it is difficult 
to establish if, say, an optimistic prediction is the result of some bias in the updating procedure or 
caused by the very positive evidence that the person has received or her skewed priors. More 
generally, field studies cannot be used to test many of the predictions of the existing theories of 
motivated inference. Lab studies, in contrast, permit such fine-grained tests. 
Any participant in our experiment faces an urn with 100 balls. Each ball has either a boy or a 
girl name written on it, and the number F ∊ [0, 100] of ‘female’ balls in the urn is known to be 
randomly determined for each subject. Further, subjects know that they can get a state prize, that is, 
0.50 euros per female ball in their own urn, and hence have an incentive to believe that F is as high 
as possible (observe well that this state prize does not depend on the subject’s choices, as F is 
randomly determined). Thirty balls are then consecutively drawn out with replacement, and the 
subject observes the name in each one. After draws 15, 22 and 30, furthermore, the subject is 
unexpectedly asked to estimate F (estimation rounds 1, 2, and 3 henceforth). While the first two 
estimations are not incentivized, the subject can get an estimation prize of 10 euros if her last 
estimation is sufficiently accurate ‒to prevent hedging, in fact, subjects could get either the state or 
the estimation prize, randomly determined with probability 0.5 at the end of the experiment. After 
round 3, furthermore, the subject must provide the shortest credible interval for F that contains 95% 
of the probability mass (this was not incentivized). 
From a Bayesian perspective, the optimal estimate of F involves a trivial problem of 
extrapolation from the observed proportion of ‘female’ balls (see Section 4.1 for a detailed 
explanation). In contrast, the models by AD and BP predict that (some) individuals will overestimate 
F, so as to correspondingly ‘inflate’ the state prize. This is particularly true when there are no 
potential losses associated to inaccurate beliefs, as in the first two estimation rounds, where 
individuals get no prize for accuracy. Since subjects in our experiment can only get either the state or 
the estimation prize, further, AD and BP predict a correlation between risk aversion and 
Bayesianism: very risk averse types would rather have realistic beliefs, so as to maximize the 
likelihood that they get something in case the estimation prize is selected for payment.    
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Overall, we find scarce evidence supporting these models, and particularly for models like 
AD and BP. Specifically for these two models, first, we do not observe systematic optimism, i.e., 
overestimation, in any of the three rounds. Indeed, the average and median subject slightly 
underestimates F in every round. Second, the size of the estimation bias is not reduced by the 
introduction of incentives for accuracy in the third round. While there are subjects who never 
underestimate F, third, they account to just 26.47 percent of the sample (N = 68) and inflate F to a 
rather limited extent. Fourth, optimism is unrelated to any of the individual characteristics that we 
record, except a relatively higher CRT score. That is, the ‘optimistic’ subjects look scarcely different 
from the others, particularly in terms of risk aversion. However, fifth, we find that overestimation in 
our experiment is extremely correlated with the sample observed: Optimists (pessimists) tend to be 
subjects who observe relatively few (many) female extractions. This is again hardly consistent with 
models like AD and BP. In what regards the confidence intervals, sixth, the model by BP says that 
optimistic subjects will report ‘positively skewed’ intervals, i.e., the subject’s estimate of F is the 
lower limit of the interval. No evidence supports this prediction, though. Note that models with 
cognitive costs like Rabin (1994) are also inconsistent with the first, fourth, and fifth findings just 
cited. They are in line though with the second finding and perhaps, conditional on the cognitive cost 
function assumed, with the limited extent of the biases observed in our experiment, i.e., our third 
finding (we have not analyzed what these models predict for the confidence intervals). Overall, 
therefore, this second family appears to fit better with our results, at least in relative terms.
2
    
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses some related 
experimental literature and our contributions to it. Section 3 introduces the experimental design. 
Section 4 starts by presenting the predictions of the Bayesian model, as well as applying AD and BP 
to our setting. This section also reports experimental results afterwards, and discusses the models 
with cognitive costs. Section 5 concludes by mentioning potential future venues of research. 
2. Literature review 
To organize this survey, we mention in what follows several predictions of the theories and 
how they compare with the existing experimental evidence so far.
3
 The first prediction refers to the 
very phenomenon of optimism and hence is common to all of the models considered here. Note yet 
that the models predict this phenomenon under different conditions, to be specified later. In addition, 
some models like Möbius et al. (2014) explicitly analyze how optimists infer, explaining belief 
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 The model in Mayraz (2013) assumes no costs to belief distortion and is hence consistent as well with our second 
finding, but not with our other findings (leaving aside the sixth one, which we have not checked). 
3
 This review cannot make justice to the whole literature in this respect, but consult Caballero and López-Pérez (2020a) 
for a fuller review of the literature on motivated inference and optimism. See also Caballero and López-Pérez (2020b) for 
a review of the existing literature on the relation between selective recall and optimism. 
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inflation as the result of asymmetric updating. As explained in the introduction, the idea is that signal 
observations are over-weighted or under-weighted depending on whether they support or contradict, 
respectively, the decider’s desired beliefs.  
Prediction 1: Deciders inflate their beliefs. Specifically, the difference between the 
subjective and the objective probabilities is correlated with the utility payoff that deciders get from 
having the desired beliefs about the state space. Inflation occurs because individuals process ‘good’ 
and ‘bad’ news asymmetrically, thus reinforcing their favorite beliefs.  
Evidence: Several studies report inflated beliefs and find evidence of asymmetric updating as 
a potential cause, but not all studies do so. In line with our discussion in the introduction, our 
interpretation is that inflation requires propitious conditions, still not well understood. Two groups of 
experimental studies can be perhaps distinguished for the sake of the exposition. In a first one, the 
beliefs analyzed are arguably relevant for self-esteem. When eliciting a subject’s posterior 
distribution about her rank in a group according to some ego-relevant trait (specifically, physical 
attractiveness and/or IQ score), for instance, Eil and Rao (2011) and Möbius et al. (2014) find 
evidence of positively skewed updating (see also Heger and Papageorge, 2018). Specifically, people 
seem to update beliefs according to Bayes’ Rule when the signal is good or desirable, and under-
update when the signal is negative. In contrast, Ertac (2011) reports negatively skewed updating, 
while Buser et al. (2018) find no evidence at the aggregate level for asymmetric updating about 
relative performance. See also Zimmermann (2020), who finds evidence of underweighting of the 
negative signals when the posteriors are elicited one month after feedback, but not when they are 
elicited immediately after. Grossman and Owens (2012), in turn, explore learning about absolute 
performance and find no evidence of asymmetric updating.  
In a second group of economic experiments, closer to our study, subjects have a financial 
stake in some specific event E and must report the posterior that E occurs after observing some 
relevant evidence ‒Gotthard-Real (2017), the Baseline condition in Barron (2020), Coutts (2019a); 
and Heger and Papageorge (2018).
4
 Little evidence of a positivity bias has been found
 
in the studies 
just cited, in spite of the fact that they display several differences in what regards the priors on E, the 
prize if E occurs, or the randomization mechanism, e.g., mechanical or using a computer program. In 
addition, Coutts (2019a) studies inference in a “value relevant” treatment, i.e., when subjects have a 
preference for some event e to be true, and a “neutral” one, and finds no differences in belief 
updating across treatments. This occurs when e is financially relevant, i.e., the E above, but also 
when it is ego-relevant, i.e., the ranking in a math or verbal quiz.  
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 Some recent studies do not fit exactly within any of the two groups considered. Engelmann et al. (2019), for instance, 
report that subjects under-estimate the probability of receiving an electric shock that is outside of their control  
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To our knowledge, there are just two lab studies in Economics reporting a motivated bias 
when subjects have a financial interest for some state. Both involve between-subjects designs, so the 
“bias” comes from the fact that one role is more positive than another one, given similar information 
but different preferences. In Mayraz (2013), subjects are shown a chart of historical wheat prices and 
have to predict afterwards the price at some future time point, getting a bonus for accuracy. In 
addition, subjects get a payoff that increases (decreases) with that price if her randomly-selected role 
is “Farmer” (“Baker”). In average, farmers make significantly higher predictions than bakers, 
consistent with a positivity bias. In the Strategic condition of Charness and Dave (2017), in turn, 
subjects play a 2x2 game. The payoff matrix is a priori uncertain, as there are two possible payoff 
constellations. While subjects in the Odd role get the same equilibrium payoff in both matrices, those 
in the Even role have a preference for one of them. Prior to playing the game, participants observe a 
sequence of six signals and their incentivized posteriors of each state/matrix reveal that Even players 
underweight more strongly the negative signals, i.e., those confirming the ‘worst’ matrix.  
Neuroscientists and psychologists have also gathered some supportive evidence for inflation 
and asymmetric updating in beliefs about future outcomes. In Sharot et al. (2011), participants are 
sequentially presented a total of 80 adverse events, such as being diagnosed with Alzheimer’s 
disease or suffering a car accident, and have 6 seconds to estimate their chances of facing any such 
event in the future (without incentives). In a second stage, subjects are shown for 2 seconds the 
actual frequency with which any such event happens among individuals living in the same socio-
cultural environment as them, and must guess their posteriors of encountering that event. Sharot et al. 
(2011) report evidence for asymmetric updating in favor of good news. Using a similar design, Ma et 
al. (2016) find that intra-nasally administered oxytocin promotes optimism and asymmetric updating. 
This is particularly true in individuals with high depression or anxiety traits, who under-weight 
undesirable feedback more pronouncedly than similar individuals in a placebo treatment ‒on how 
depressed individuals update beliefs, possibly in a relatively more balanced manner, see also Alloy 
and Abramson (1979) and Garrett et al. (2014). ∎ 
The next prediction follows from models like BP. The idea is that people will be less biased 
when there is more risk. Taking into account that having inaccurate beliefs often leads to suboptimal 
choices, that is, the models propose that belief inflation will be attenuated when acting as an optimist 
leads to large expected losses (relative to a Bayesian). Intuitively, people think more when there is a 
lot at stake, and hence their beliefs are dominated relatively less by their “animal spirits”. 
Prediction 2: The correlation between beliefs and preferences will get weaker as the 
expected material loss for holding inaccurate beliefs increases. 
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Evidence: several of the papers cited above have systematically analyzed whether the size of 
the expected loss reduces the degree of inflation. Coutts (2019a,b) runs sessions with different 
accuracy payments, i.e., low ($3), medium ($10), or high ($20). In addition, participants can either 
get a nil or high prize ($80) if some target event E occurs. According to Prediction 2, subjects have 
no incentive to distort their beliefs about the probability of E in case the prize is $0, provided that 
they get no other utility from the occurrence of E, e.g., if E is not ego-relevant. In contrast, distortion 
should be maximal if the prize is high and the accuracy payment low, i.e., $3. In spite of this, the 
author concludes that neither prizes nor accuracy payments alter updating. Mayraz (2013) varies the 
size of the accuracy bonus from £1 to £5 and reports that the magnitude of the bias does not depend 
on the scale of the bonus (neither on the size of the prize associated to the desirable event). Similarly, 
Ertac (2011) studies the effect of rewarding accurate beliefs and finds no significant difference 
across compensated and non-compensated sessions in terms of the distribution of priors and the 
absolute value of the bias (Mann–Whitney test, p = 0.89 and p = 0.79, respectively). See also 
Engelmann et al. (2019) for similar negative results regarding the accuracy payment. If people suffer 
from a positivity bias, in summary, the cost of such bias does not seem to set limits on its size, at 
least with the parameterizations that have been considered so far. ■ 
In some models, belief distortion is assumed to be cognitively challenging and hence 
involving an explicit cost ─Bracha and Brown (2012), Rabin (1994). For instance, Rabin (1994, p. 
180) contends that “developing beliefs that differ from this level [of natural, intellectually honest 
beliefs] is costly because it may intrinsically conflict with other parts of a person’s belief system, and 
reintegrating it can involve laborious intellectual activity.”  
Prediction 3: Less inflation when it is cognitively costly. 
Evidence: To our knowledge, the experimental literature has not dealt thoroughly with this 
question yet. Coutts (2019b) compares and tests some predictions of BP’s model of optimal 
expectations and the model of affective decision making proposed by Bracha and Brown (2012), 
which includes explicit mental costs from belief distortion. While Coutts (2019b) finds limited 
evidence supporting some of the implications of the model by Bracha and Brown (2012), its work 
focuses on the effects of state-dependent prizes and accuracy prizes on optimistic bias, and not 
directly on the cognitive aspects of belief distortion. 
3. Experimental design 
Any subject faces her own virtual urn, with 100 balls inside. Each ball in the urn has either a 
boy or a girl Spanish name, and the 100 names in the urn are different. Balls with a girl/boy name are 
called henceforth female/male balls ‒these terms were not used in the subjects’ instructions; see 
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Appendix I. The precise rate θ of female balls is a multiple of 0.01 selected by the computer with 
uniform probability over the interval [0, 1] at the start of the session; the rate of male balls is hence 1 
– θ. It follows that the number of female balls F is equal to 100·θ; we will make reference generally 
to θ for consistency, although the instructions were expressed in terms of F. Although the subject 
does not know θ, the method to determine it is known in advance.
5
 Priors are hence arguably fixed. 
Each subject then observes the realization, i.e., name, of an a priori undetermined number (in fact, 
30) of consecutive random draws with replacement from her/his box. Subjects did not observe 
others’ samples. After the first 15, 22 and 30 extractions, further, the subject is asked to provide a 
point estimation of θ –therefore, she gives estimates in 3 rounds, each one with a progressively 
enlarged dataset. Subjects were explained each estimation task only immediately after observing the 
corresponding extractions and did not receive any feedback about prior extractions.  
Subjects get either a ‘state prize’ that depends on the rate/state θ or an ‘estimation prize’ 
depending on the accuracy of the participant’s last estimation of θ. The prize that a subject finally 
gets is randomly determined with probability 0.5 at the end of the experiment. As a ‘state prize’, 
specifically, the subject gets 0.50 euros for each female ball in the urn, e.g., a maximum of 50 euros 
if θ = 1. For the ‘estimation prize’, in turn, let    ∊ [0, 1] denote a subject’s last, i.e., third, estimation. 
The subject earns 10 euros if the corresponding error |θ –  | is smaller or equal to 0.02, and 0 euros 
otherwise. The elicitation of the first two estimations of θ, in turn, is not incentivized. Participants 
are informed about the nature of the ‘state prize’ before they observe any extractions, whereas the 
structure of the ‘estimation prize’ is only revealed just before the last estimation task, i.e., after the 
30 extractions. Indeed, the initial instructions only stated that with probability 0.5 they will get either 
the ‘state prize’ or an undefined prize whose nature will be specified later (this design choice is 
irrelevant to test the theories considered here, but relevant for the analysis in Caballero and López-
Pérez (2020b)). 
Additional tasks and questions are inserted between some extractions. After the first 7 
extractions, specifically, we included a brief questionnaire where we gathered information on 
personal and socio-demographic characteristics (age, gender, major, religiosity, and political 
ideology). A risk aversion index was elicited after the first 19 extractions.
6
 Also, subjects completed 
an expanded cognitive reflection test or CRT (Frederick, 2005), including the three classical 
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 To determine the specific names in each urn, we used two lists with the most popular, non-compound female and male 
names in Spain, respectively. The lists, elaborated by the Spanish National Statistics Institute, order the names according 
to frequency; see https://www.ine.es/en/welcome.shtml. Once θ had been randomly determined for a subject, therefore, 
we randomly selected 100·θ girl names and 100·(1-θ) boy names in the corresponding lists to ‘fill’ the urn.   
6
 Subjects faced the choice between lottery A with prizes 2 and 1.5 Euros and lottery B with prizes 4 and 0 Euros, with 
equal probabilities of the larger and lower prize across lotteries. Letting P denote the probability of the larger prize, they 
had to indicate the threshold value of P such that they always preferred B to A, on a scale from 0 to 100.   
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questions and two additional ones, after the first 26 extractions. Furthermore, after the third 
estimation task, i.e., the incentivized one, subjects had to report the shortest 95% confidence interval 
they could figure out. In other words, they indicated a lower and an upper bound for θ, such that they 
believed that the correct θ was ‘almost surely’ in the interval determined by those limits. Confidence 
intervals were not incentivized; as we discuss later, however, our results do not differ much from 
those in López-Pérez et al. (2020), where subjects were paid for accuracy. After this interval 
estimation, additionally, we included an incentivized ‘recall task’ and two questions so as to check 
whether they expected to recall better female than male extractions, i.e., good than bad news; this 
data is irrelevant for the test of the theories considered here, but see Caballero and López-Pérez 
(2020b) for a full description and analysis. Subjects responded, in addition, two questions on 
statistical knowledge, the LOT-R test on optimism (Scheier and Carver, 1985; Scheier et al., 1994), 
and a test on disappointment, in this order, thus ending the experiment.  
The study consisted of six computerized sessions at Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, with a 
total of 68 participants. The software used was z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Participants were not 
students of the experimenters. After being seated at a visually isolated computer terminal, each 
participant received written instructions that described the decision problem (translated to English in 
Appendix I). Subjects could read the instructions at their own pace and we answered their questions 
in private. Understanding of the rules was checked with a computerized control questionnaire that all 
subjects had to answer correctly before they could start making choices (see the screenshot in 
Appendix I). At the end of the experiment, subjects were informed of their final payoff and paid in 
private. Each session lasted approximately 60 minutes, including paying subjects individually, and 
on average subjects earned 20.50 euros, including a show-up fee of 3 euros. 
Discussion 
While appropriate for the test of the theories considered in this paper, the elicitation of a 
subject’s   , i.e., the mode of her posterior beliefs, is a rather unusual feature in the literature on belief 
updating, specifically on motivated inference, where the subject’s posterior probability distribution is 
often elicited instead ‒e.g., using the lottery method as in Coutts (2019a), or the crossover method in 
Möbius et al. (2014). In a sense, we elicit an ordinal instead of a cardinal measure of probability. We 
introduced this relatively novel aspect for three reasons. First of all, we found the question of how 
people compute empirical frequencies when they have a preference for some states/values an 
interesting one in itself. Second, incentive compatible elicitation procedures are often complex to 
explain to subjects, e.g., Schlag et al. (2015). In contrast, our estimation prize is rather 
straightforward. Third, we suspected that the computation of the exact probability of any rate was a 
substantially more demanding problem than the estimation of   , which requires only extrapolating 
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from the sample (see 4.1). As noted by Tversky and Kahneman (1983) and Gigerenzer and Hoffrage 
(1995), posing problems in frequentist (as opposed to probabilistic) terms may mitigate some errors. 
In summary, our design attempted to reduce any potential noise due to the subjects’ 
misunderstanding of the elicitation procedures or the statistical nature of the problem. The drawback 
is that we lose rich information on their posteriors, although the confidence interval estimation offers 
some insights. Note also that, since we do not elicit the precise posteriors, it is not our research goal 
to analyze whether people update their probabilistic beliefs in a conservative manner, or display 
asymmetric updating. Yet these are issues that have received attention before, as we have explained 
in Section 2.   
For another remark, note that subjects are never paid for both their beliefs and the actual state 
θ. Otherwise we might face hedging problems and hence the subjects’ potential misreporting of their 
beliefs in the incentivized elicitation (Blanco et al., 2010). To understand this, suppose for the sake 
of the exposition that a subject can get both prizes and believes that θ = 0.9 with probability p > ½ 
and θ = 0.4 with probability 1- p. If she reports    = 0.9, therefore, she expects with probability p a 
state prize of 50·0.9 = 45 Euros plus an estimation prize of 10 Euros, and a payoff of 50·0.4 = 20 
Euros with probability 1- p. A report of    = 0.4, on the other hand, generates a lottery with payoffs of 
45 and 20 + 10 with respective probabilities p and 1- p. It follows that a sufficiently risk averse 
subject would rather report    = 0.4, so as reduce variability. More generally, the Bayesian prediction 
would be conditional on the subject’s degree of risk aversion if there were hedging problems; our 
design prevents this kind of complexities.
7
 In any case, we note incidentally that Ertac (2011) does 
not find strong evidence in support for hedging in her study.  
Finally, the beliefs were incentivized only in one round, i.e., the last one. The rationale under 
this design choice is multiple. On the one hand, the models of optimism described in Section 4 say 
that subjects will inflate more when the ‘price’ of inflation, i.e., the potential monetary loss for being 
inaccurate, is nil (see Proposition III below). The models therefore predict more overestimation in 
the non-incentivized rounds. A potential objection against not incentivizing some rounds is that 
subjects could give little thought to the issue. We note however that these are exactly the type of 
situations in which BP intuitively predict more optimism and, more substantially, we can compare 
our results across rounds and hence check whether incentives reduce noise (anticipating somehow 
our results, the evidence is negative in that respect). The reason to incentivize precisely the last 
round, further, was to avoid ambiguous predictions by the models of optimism. If subjects were paid 
instead in the first round only, for example, in posterior rounds they would simultaneously wish to 
                                                          
7
 Subjects also get a payoff in the recall task, but this is introduced after the estimation task.  
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believe that (i) the share of female balls is high, but also that (ii) their estimate in the first round was 
accurate. In these circumstances, it would not be clear whether, according to models of optimism, we 
should expect optimistic estimates or some degree of anchoring relative to the first estimation. The 
incentive structure of our design, in contrast, tries to guarantee that only incentive (i) is present in the 
first two rounds, while both (i) and (iii) a desire for accuracy are relevant in the last round. 
4. A test of several theories  
 In this section, we first introduce in 4.1 the Bayesian model. Afterwards, we apply AD and 
BP to our experiment and derive a series of predictions, which guide the posterior analysis of the 
experimental evidence. The discussion concerning models with cognitive costs comes at the end of 
this section. 
4.1 Models and predictions 
We start by introducing some general notation, together with the standard Bayesian theory.  
General setup & the Bayesian model 
An expected payoff-maximizer called Eve must estimate the frequency/rate   ∊ [0, 1] with 
which some phenomenon f occurs. Specifically, there is an i.i.d. signal S, taking on value v ∊ {f, m}, 
and such that probability (S = f) =   ‒for expositional purposes, we sometimes refer to f as female, 
and m as male. Eve does not know the exact value of  . Let   ⊆ [0, 1] denote the space of potential 
values of   (for expositional convenience, we assume that   is finite). Eve has prior beliefs over  , 
quantified by a finitely additive probability measure. Let    denote Eve’s priors about rate      . In 
our experiment,   = {0, 0.01,…, 1}, whereas the (uniform) prior of any rate    is    = 1/101. 
Eve has observed some realizations of S and hence can use that evidence to update her priors. 
The number of female observations is denoted as f and that of male ones as m. Given data D = (f, 
m), Eve’s posterior beliefs about any       are obtained by means of Bayes’ rule (the last equality 
is true only if priors are uniform): 
pk|D = 
     
    -   
 
      
    -   
 
    
 = 
  
    -   
 
   
    -   
 
 
      (1) 
If Eve were a subject in our experiment, she would face a rather simple problem of inference. 
Let f ∊ [0, 1] denote the (rounded) frequency of female balls in the sample observed by Eve, i.e., f = 
 
    
 . Since priors are uniform in our experiment, it follows from a standard Bayesian argument that 
Eve’s posterior beliefs have a unique mode at    = f and a concave shape. Given the structure of the 
estimation prize in the third round, therefore, Eve reports there an estimate    = f ‒except when the 
sample observed is ‘extreme’, i.e., contains 0, 1, 29, or 30 female balls; in these cases, she reports an 
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estimation slightly different than f, a point that we take into account in our analysis below.
8
 When the 
point estimations are not incentivized, finally, the argument is analogous except that no distortion is 
here expected for any value of f. Our first result is hence direct. 
 Proposition I (Bayesian): In each estimation round, a Bayesian subject who has observed so 
far a sample where the (rounded) share of female balls equals f ∊ [0, 1] chooses f as an estimate of θ. 
The only exception appears in the last estimation round, where some slight distortion is predicted if 
the sample observed contains extremely few or extremely many female balls. In average, point 
estimations do not significantly differ from the average empirical frequency. 
Choice of beliefs: Applying AD and BP to our experiment 
We maintain the notation introduced in the general setup, and consider an agent called Abel, 
identical in all respects to Eve except Bayesian updating, i.e., equation (1) above. If Abel participates 
in our experiment, specifically, any estimation round is conceived as divided in two periods; in 
period 1, Abel chooses his subjective beliefs about θ,
9
 while he opts for the corresponding estimate 
     in period 2, based on those beliefs. Let     denote the subjective probability of state    as 
chosen in period 1. Abel can choose any set of subjective probabilities, provided that they satisfy 
Kolmogorov’s probability axioms. 
Abel’s problem in any round can be solved recursively. In period 2, he chooses the estimate 
that maximizes his expected monetary payoff, based on his subjective beliefs. If we abstract for 
simplicity from the payoff in the recall task, Abel’s payoff equals either the state prize or the 
estimation prize; both prizes have equal probability. The state prize, recall, is proportional to the 
share of female balls, i.e., equal to    , where   = 50 in our experiment. With respect to the 
estimation prize, we simplify matters by assuming that it amounts to zero unless estimation    exactly 
matches the actual state of the world (i.e.     ), in which case it equals   (implicitly,   = 10 in the 
third, incentivized round, but   = 0 in the first two rounds). Further, let u(x) denote the utility 
                                                          
8
 To clarify, think of the case in which the sample contains 30 female balls. The most likely value of θ is 1. If Eve reports 
an estimate of 1, however, she would eventually earn prize 2 only if the true rate is 0.98, 0.99 or 1. On the other hand, if 
her estimate is 0.98, she earns prize 2 if the true rate is between 0.96 and 1, both included. A further subtlety is that the 
distribution of posteriors is not symmetric in general, and particularly for the samples considered here. If Eve observes 1 
female ball, specifically, the mode is 0.03, but interval [0.01, 0.05] has less aggregate probability than [0.02, 0.06]. In this 
case, therefore, Eve should report    = 0.04. A similar argument applies when there are 29 female balls in the sample. 
There are no other cases where a rational Bayesian should report an estimate different than the mode. These “distortions” 
could be prevented if the estimation prize required an absolutely correct estimate of θ. Since this could reduce a subject’s 
incentive to exert attention on this task, however, we tried to achieve an equilibrium. Note also that the optimal 
estimation of θ depends on the structure of the estimation prize. A different set of incentives could imply that the optimal 
point estimate is a different statistic than the mode, like the mean, the median, etc.  
9
 To reduce degrees of freedom and for simplicity, we posit that subjects in our experiment trust the experimenter’s 
instructions although, formally speaking, the models here allow subjects to choose their beliefs in this respect as well 
‒e.g., believing that the probabilities of earning either the state or the estimation prize are not the same. 
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function of money, where x indicates the monetary gain; we posit u(0) = 0. In period 2, to sum up, 




                   
 
 
                   (2) 
It comes straightforward that (2) is maximized by choosing the    that matches the most likely 
state of nature according to the subjective probabilities, i.e. the subjective mode     with subjective 
probability      such that            for any      . If the posterior subjective distribution has several 
modes, Abel is indifferent between them; in this case,     denotes the mode chosen in period 2. Let 
    denote the objective probability of     ‒note well that     does not represent the objective 
probability of the objective mode    , since     is not necessarily equal to    . The corresponding 
probabilities      and     are analogously defined for the objective mode, which in our problem is 
unique for any data D observed (see Proposition I). 
In period 1, optimal beliefs are chosen. Following AD and BP, we assume that Abel may 
experience some anticipatory utility at the end of period 1. That is, he gets utility from thinking about 
his future material payoff. This anticipation utility depends on the specific parameters described 
above and his current beliefs, i.e. the subjective probabilities. In period 1, that is, Abel chooses the 




                        
 
 
                      = 
 
 
                  
 
 
                            (3) 
where     reflects the intensity of the anticipatory utility. Note that expression (3) has four 
components. Two of them refer to the anticipatory utility from the state and estimation prizes, i.e., 
             and         , respectively; they depend on the beliefs chosen in Period 1. Intuitively, 
the first component is maximized when beliefs put the whole probability mass on    = 1, while the 
second one is maximized when a single rate receives all the probability mass; it follows that 
anticipatory utility is maximized when rate    = 1 is certain, i.e.,     = 1 for    = 1. In turn, a third 
component of (3) is the objective expectation of the state prize,            , which cannot be 
altered by Abel. Finally, the objective expectation of the estimation prize,        , depends on 
Abel’s estimate, which in turn depends on his beliefs. The size of this component decreases as     
moves further from    , as this reduces    . Several implications follow from this optimization 
problem. The proofs can be consulted in Appendix III. 
Proposition II. If    , then any subjective belief such that     coincides with the objective 
mode     is optimal. 
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Proposition II implies that, in the absence of anticipation utility, only beliefs that do not alter 
the optimal action in the second period are optimal. Note the difference with Eve’s case: Since Abel 
can choose his beliefs, the optimal ones when     are indeterminate, except that the mode of Eve’s 
and Abel’s must coincide. 
Proposition III. If     , then the optimal beliefs are characterized by        for    = 1 and 
       for any     . 
This simply states that, if there is no potential loss in keeping distorted beliefs, then it is 
optimal for Abel to believe that the only possible state is the most favorable. This prediction is 
relevant for the first two estimation rounds, where there were no incentives for accuracy. The 
following results offer insights on the third, incentivized round. 
Proposition IV. The optimal subjective mode    
  is at least equal to the objective mode. If 
     further, optimal beliefs are characterized by        for any       
 . 
In our experiment, Proposition IV implies that Abel will never underestimate the number of 
female balls in the urn and that posteriors will be extremely skewed about its mode, with clear 
implications on Abel’s (subjective) 95% confidence intervals. The rationale for this prediction is 
quite intuitive. On one hand, the assignment of non-nil probability           to any rate       
  is 
‘useless’: it does not affect the estimate at period 2 and hence the objective probability of getting the 
estimation prize, and has an opportunity cost, in that     could be assigned instead to    
 , thus 
increasing anticipatory utility from both prizes (if    ). In addition, when Abel chooses beliefs 
where the subjective mode is different from the objective mode, this comes at the cost of reducing 
the objective probability of getting the estimation prize. The only incentive for such a choice, 
therefore, is to sufficiently increase the subjectively expected payoff from the state prize, which 
requires choosing beliefs with a subjective mode at least equal to    .   
The remaining propositions study conditions for overestimation, i.e., the subjective mode 
being higher than the objective one, and for overprecision, which refers in our context to the length 
of the 95% subjective confidence interval. In very general terms, they express that the position 
chosen by Abel for the subjective mode has implications in the optimum regarding the level of 
overprecision. We distinguish two different situations.  
Proposition V. Consider beliefs with subjective mode      If                  , a 
necessary (but not sufficient) condition for these beliefs to be optimal is that they assign       to 
any       .  
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Proposition V implies that any beliefs with subjective mode ‘close’ to    = 1 cannot be 
optimal if they do not concentrate all the probability mass in that mode. In these circumstances, 
intuitively, anticipatory utility is maximized when Abel is certain to get the estimation prize. A 
problem of Proposition V is that it says little about the optimal value    
  and cannot be tested using 
directly observable data. However, Propositions IV and V imply the following corollary, which 
states a sufficient (although not necessary) condition in the optimum for maximal overprecision, i.e., 
a degenerate belief distribution. This condition is based on the value of the objective mode    , 
which is determined by the evidence available to Abel and hence observable.  
Corollary 1: If                  , Abel assigns all the probability mass to one single 
rate. Its specific value depends on the curvature of the utility function of money, u(x), but also on  . 
In particular, Abel is Bayesian, i.e.,          if   is low enough or if the utility of money increases 
at a sufficiently lower rate than the posterior beliefs (as we move towards the objective mode). 
To clarify how stringent condition                   is, note that   = 10 and   = 50 
imply that the condition is necessarily satisfied if Abel is risk-averse and        . However, the 
condition can be also fulfilled for much lower values of     if Abel displays sufficiently high levels 
of risk-aversion. Let    denote the rate such that                 . Corollary 1 says that, if 
       , Abel is extremely overprecise, in the sense that he believes that there is only one possible 
state of nature. When     <   , in contrast, the following prediction shows that Abel’s posteriors can 
be more spread. In other words, beliefs can be nondegenerate only if     <     The degree of 
overprecision, in other words, is conditional on the evidence received. In average, confidence 
intervals will be larger when     is relatively small, in particular when     < ½. 
Proposition VI. Consider beliefs with subjective mode     such that           
       . Conditional on risk aversion, a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for these beliefs to 
be optimal is that they assign evenly as much probability as possible to some of the largest state(s), 
subject to          for any   .  
While Proposition VI is not very specific about the optimal    
 , a similar argument to that in 
Corollary 1 seems to apply as well for low values of    . That is, again,    
      if   is low 
enough or if the utility of money increases at a sufficiently lower rate than the posterior beliefs (as 
we move towards the objective mode). In summary, risk aversion correlates with more Bayesian 
estimations (assuming that Abel’s degree of risk aversion is independent of his  ). Intuitively, a 
subjective mode larger than     increases the anticipatory utility from the state prize but reduces the 
chances of earning anything if the estimation prize is finally the selected one. Obviously, a very risk-
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averse Abel strongly dislikes such possibility. Note also that, since    depends on Abel’s degree of 
risk aversion, a relatively risk-averse Abel would also be less likely to be over-precise, given some 
evidence characterized by     , although this prediction is more complex to test and hence will not 
be considered in our posterior data analysis. 
4. 2 Data analysis 
For starters, we consider the Bayesian model. Proposition I above states that, in any round, 
subjects should report estimations of θ that track the (rounded) frequency f of female balls in the 
sample observed by them so far (leaving aside extreme samples in the last estimation round). 
Hypothesis I: In average, point estimations do not significantly differ from the average f. 
Evidence: In average, the subjects’ urns have around 56.7 female balls, i.e., the mean θ 
equals 0.567. In the samples corresponding to the first 15, 22, and 30 extractions, furthermore, the 
mean (non-rounded) f is 0.584, 0.577 and 0.578, respectively. Since the subjects’ actual estimates of 
θ have averages equal to 0.517, 0.522 and 0.530, respectively, we observe a systematic (although 
small) underestimation of the number of female balls in all rounds. In this respect, the differences 
between the mean Bayesian and subjects’ estimates are significant in the first two rounds (paired t-




1 2 3 
[0, 0.2) 0,010 0,060 0,030 
[0.2, 0.4) 0,060 -0,005 -0,025 
[0.4, 0.6) 0,000 -0,010 0,000 
[0.6, 0.8) 0,005 -0,020 0,000 
[0.8, 1) -0,140 -0,110 -0,020 
Aggregated -0,005 -0,020 -0,010 
Table 1: Median deviation from the Bayesian estimation, conditional on the observed frequency 
For a more disaggregate analysis, we define a subject’s deviation in a round as the difference 
between her actual estimate of θ and the predicted Bayesian estimate. In Table 1, each column 
corresponds to one of the three estimation rounds, and there is one row for each of the intervals [0, 
0.2); [0.2, 0.4), etc. Each cell indicates the subjects’ median deviation, conditional on the estimation 
round and the value of f observed so far. Intuitively, the table compares the subjects’ biases when 
most or the majority of news are bad, i.e., f low, and when most news are good. The Bayesian model 
predicts a nil deviation in each cell. In this respect, we see that the median deviation is practically 
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zero in several cells of the table. Interestingly, overestimation seems to be more systematic when f is 
low, whereas underestimation tends to occur when f is large. We will return to this point later.
10
 
When we consider average, not median, deviations, the differences with the Bayesian 
prediction are a bit more pronounced ‒see Table A in Appendix II. Some inflation is observed in this 
case, particularly when f is low. However, it is far from systematic. Indeed, recall, the overall mean 
deviation is negative in any round. Further, in those contingencies where there is significant inflation 
or alternatively deflation, it is largely run by the presence of some outliers. This is illustrated by 
Figure 1, where each dot corresponds to a subject, placed according to her actual estimate in the third 
round, and her predicted, Bayesian estimate. As we see, the majority of the points are close to the 




Figure 1: Subjects’ estimates in the last round vs. Bayesian prediction 
Result I: The average and median subjects slightly underestimate θ in any round. Conditional 
on the actual frequency of female balls observed by the individual, f, inflation is observed at a 
systematic level only when f is low, and is rather small in size. 
Consider now the models by AD and BP described in Section 4.1. As we proved there, these 
models imply that subjects should inflate the estimate of θ, that is, the average/median estimate 
should be significantly higher than the average/median observed f in any estimation round. Further, 
                                                          
10
 Does this evidence signal a bias “towards 50%”, maybe because people have (inaccurate) priors assigning non-uniform 
probability to θ = 0.5? We note in this respect that our control questionnaire explicitly asked whether priors were uniform 
(see Appendix I) and that Figure 1 is hardly consistent with such hypothesis, although we cannot exclude this possibility 
for a few subjects.  
11
 As the figure shows, the underestimation observed in the third round is not exclusively due to the ‘distortions’ 
described in Footnote 8. Out of the 68 subjects, 10 of them faced in the last round a sample with 0, 1, 29, or 30 female 
balls, and just 7 of them observed either 29 or 30 balls, which are the only cases where some underestimation is predicted 
by the Bayesian model, although never higher than 2 balls. Yet the mean deviation among these subjects was -0.1495, 
i.e., around 15 balls, while the median one was -0.0267. Note though that one of these 7 subjects deviated in 76 balls 
from the Bayesian estimation; the mean deviation among the remaining 6 subjects is -0.0478.  
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inflation should not be conditional on f. While the evidence described in Result I is not very 
encouraging, Figure 1 above also shows that some people overestimate. This warrants further tests of 
those models. In what follows, therefore, we consider additional hypotheses based on Propositions II 
to VI. The next one follows from Propositions II and IV. Intuitively, the level of inflation depends on 
whether the estimate of θ is incentivized. Without incentives for accuracy, there is no risk of a 
material loss for having a mistaken belief about θ. Hence, utility is maximized if the belief is as 
optimistic as possible, which means that Abel should report    = 1 in the first two, non-incentivized 
estimations. When there is some risk, in contrast, Abel should infer in a more Bayesian manner, so as 
to reduce the chance of a mistake (this is particularly true if Abel is very risk averse or cares little 
about anticipatory utility, i.e., has a small  ). In the third estimation, that is, the average    should be 
strictly lower than 1 but higher than the average f, assuming that subjects display enough 
heterogeneity in   and risk aversion. 
Hypothesis II: The prevalence and extent of inflation is higher in the first two rounds. In the 
third round, an optimistic subject’s accuracy depends on her degree of risk aversion.  
Evidence: Several findings speak against the first part of the hypothesis. To start, the share of 
subjects who give inflated estimates in the first, second, and third rounds equals 36.76, 35.29 and 
33.82, respectively. In theory, there should be less people inflating in the third round, but the effect 
seems negligible (McNemar’s test, p-value = 0.6171 and 0.7815 for the comparison of the first and 
second round with the third one, respectively). Second, people do not become more accurate as a 
result of the introduction of incentives in the third round. To check this, we consider the absolute 
value of a subject’s deviation in a round, which measures the extent of her error. At first sight, we 
observe increased accuracy, as the mean of the absolute deviation after 15, 22 and 30 extractions is 
0.1378, 0.1159 and 0.1060, respectively. An important question, however, is whether this increased 
accuracy is the result of a learning process or caused by the incentives introduced in the last 
estimation, as Hypothesis II contends. Thus, we estimate a linear panel data model where the Y 
variable is a subject’s deviation from f (in absolute terms) and the explanatory variables are (i) the 
round number (1, 2 or 3), in order to measure learning effects; and (ii) a dummy for the third stage, 
to capture any additional effect due to the incentives provided. Note that learning effects should 
improve accuracy in the second and third rounds relative to the previous one. In this respect, we find 
that the coefficient of variable (i) is negative and significant (-0.0219, p-value = 0.023), although 
quantitatively modest, while that of variable (ii) is not significantly different from zero (p-value = 
0.488). There is hence some limited learning effect, while the incentives introduced in the last 
estimation do not increase accuracy. We have also explored whether incentives affect the direction, if 
not the extent, of the bias. For this, we run a simple linear regression where the dependent variable is 
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a subject’s deviation from f, i.e., not in absolute value, and the X-variable is a dummy taking value 1 
when the estimation is made in the third, incentivized round. The coefficient of this variable is 
positive but non-significant (p-value = 0.698; results are similar with a panel data model). Observe 
that the positive sign, although non-significant, means that the deviations tend to move towards the 
positive side in the last round, something unpredicted by the models (people should inflate less 
frequently then).  
We move now to the second part of Hypothesis II, together with a more thorough study of 
heterogeneity. As we have said, the overall evidence points out that most subjects do not exhibit a 
substantial bias. Yet averages can be misleading if some people inflate and others deflate. To check 
for heterogeneity, we compute the share of subjects who under-estimate θ never, once, twice or 
thrice across all rounds. The respective figures are 26.47, 20.59, 17.65 and 35.29. It can be worth to 
analyze what characterizes the subjects in this former group, i.e., the most systematically ‘optimistic’ 
ones, who never report an estimate lower than the Bayesian one (see Proposition IV above).
12
 Before 
answering this question, however, it must be noted that these subjects do not exhibit very large 
deviations from f; the median deviation is 0.05 and the average one is 0.10.
13
 For the sake of 
comparison, the median absolute deviation is 0.03, 0.08, and 0.13 among the subjects who under-
estimate one, twice, and thrice, respectively.  
A first thing we observe among the optimistic subjects is that they do not act more Bayesian 
in the third round, i.e., more accurate. This is indicated by the linear panel data model explored 
above: if we add a dummy for these subjects, they are not significantly more accurate in the third 
round (p-value = 0.482). A second thing is that there is a clear correlation between the observed 
frequency f and the degree of optimism, i.e., the number of rounds in which a subject does not under-
estimate. Figure 2 below provides a comprehensive picture. Each box corresponds to a different 
group of subjects, i.e., those who underestimated in 0, 1, 2, or 3 rounds, and gives information about 
the mean f observed by those subjects across rounds. Specifically, the length of each box represents 
the inter-quartile range (IQR) in the corresponding distribution, whereas the vertical lines extend 
above (below) so as to include all data points within 1.5 IQR of the upper (lower) quartile, stopping 
at the largest such value. The horizontal line within each box, in turn, indicates the median value of 
the mean f observed in the associated distribution. As we can see, half of the participants that never 
underestimate θ observed a mean frequency lower than 0.345 while half of the participants who were 
consistently pessimistic across all rounds observed a mean f greater than 0.785.        
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 Our conclusions below are similar if we instead define an optimistic subject as one who gives an estimate strictly 
larger than the Bayesian one in all rounds. 
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Figure 2: Mean observed frequency conditional on number of underestimations of θ 
Therefore the ‘optimistic’ subjects tend to observe samples with relatively few female, i.e., 
good signals. Are they different from the other subjects in other respects? To study this issue, we run 
two regressions. To start, a logit regression finds no significant correlation between a binary variable 
taking value 1 when the subject strictly inflates in all rounds, and (i) any of our socio-demographic 
variables, (ii) the subject’s degree of risk aversion, (iii) the number of correctly recalled names (net 
of errors), i.e., with the subject’s memory capacity, and (iv) her knowledge of Statistics.
14
 The only 
exception is the CRT score: More reflexive people are significantly (p = 0.041) more likely to 
overestimate in all rounds.
15
 Similar results are obtained in a panel data model where the dependent 
variable is the subject’s deviation in each round: The only significant X-variables are the observed 
frequency (p-value < 0.001) and the CRT score (p-value = 0.008), which predict a negative and a 
positive effect, respectively. We stress that our index of risk aversion has no significant predictive 
power in the econometric models that we have specified, including one focused on the third round 
and the optimistic subjects: risk aversion does not correlate with a lower deviation, i.e., ‘more’ 
Bayesian estimates.    
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 As a measure of their statistical knowledge, participants first answered the following question: “In an electoral survey 
with a sample of 10 voters randomly chosen, 40 percent of them stated they were voting for Party A. From this data and 
assuming that there are 1000 voters in the country, how many of them do you think will vote for Party A? Provide your 
best estimate, which must be a number between 0 and 1000.” In addition, they were also asked how many ECTS on 
Statistics and related subjects (Econometrics, Psychometrics, etc) they had passed in the last five years. 
15
  We have also included the amount of time that each subject takes to complete each estimation round, i.e., from the 
moment that the corresponding screen appears until the subject enters the estimate and proceeds to the next screen. Our 
hypothesis here is that optimistic subjects might respond relatively fast, without much thought, in these rounds. Yet none 
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To further explore the relationship between the CRT score and inflation, Figure 3 below 
represents the average deviation (grey bars) and the average absolute deviation (white bars), 
conditional on the subject’s CRT score. Two things are worth mentioning here. First, the size of the 
errors, i.e., the absolute values, tends to be higher for those subjects with low CRT scores, although 
the effect is not entirely systematic (subjects with a score of 4 have relatively large errors). Second, 
the CRT score is apparently related with the sign of the errors, as reflexive subjects tend to inflate; 
note yet that the degree of inflation is in average very small: these subjects tend to be optimistic, but 
very little. The following result summarizes our key findings so far. 
Result II: The size and direction of the deviations does not depend on the round, and hence 
on the risk of a loss. The share of subjects who overestimate in all rounds is relatively small; 
moreover, these subjects deviate little from the Bayesian benchmark and do not appear different 
from other subjects, except in their CRT score and the sample observed (relatively few positive 
signals). Risk aversion does not predict more Bayesianism among the optimistic subjects in the third 
round. Overall, the evidence seems hardly consistent with models of optimism like AD and BP.     
 
Figure 3: Mean deviation (gray) and mean absolute deviation (white) from the Bayesian 
estimation, conditional on CRT score 
The following hypothesis explores the subjects’ degree of doubt in their inferences, as 
measured by the 95 percent confidence interval elicited after the third estimation round. If subjects 
can choose their beliefs, it seems at first sight natural that they should express little doubt, i.e., very 
narrow confidence intervals, particularly since the interval estimations are never incentivized and 
hence entail no risk ‒see Möbius et al. (2014) for an application of these ideas to financial markets. 
Specifically, optimists might assign all the probability mass to one single rate.  As we have shown in 
Section 4.1, however, this kind of extreme over-precision must be present when        , but not 
necessarily when     <   , in which case posteriors might be more spread, conditional on risk 
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aversion. In addition, Proposition IV says that Abel will never assign positive probability to any rate 
below the subjective mode, i.e., the point estimation. 
Hypothesis III: For an optimistic subject, confidence intervals are asymmetric, assigning in 
particular nil probability to any rate below   . Further, they are larger when     is relatively small, 
e.g., when     ≤ ½.  
Evidence: Contrary to the hypothesis, the confidence intervals were generally symmetric 
around the last point estimation. Specifically, there are no significant differences between the mean 
last estimate of θ and the mean center of the confidence intervals (paired t-test, p = 0.1014). Figure 4 
further illustrates this point. Note also that most subjects lie below the diagonal. Hence subjects 
report intervals whose midpoints tend to be slightly lower than the estimate of θ, contrary to the 
predictions by the optimism models.   
 
Figure 4: Subject’s last estimate of θ vs. midpoint of the stated confidence interval 
Note yet that Hypothesis III explicitly refers to the optimistic subjects. Hence, a relevant 
question is whether the people who never under-estimate θ report also asymmetric intervals. We 
check this first with a simple linear regression where the dependent variable is the difference 
between the midpoint of the interval reported by the subject and her last estimate (this difference is 
called D below), while the X-variable is a binary one taking value 1 when the subject never gives a 
deflated estimate. The coefficient happens to be negative, although non-significant (p-value = 0.287). 
Since the estimated constant is negative (and non-significant) as well, midpoints are even lower 
among the optimistic types, which hardly fits with Hypothesis III.
16
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 If we control in the regression for the effect of the observed frequency f, closely correlated with optimism in our 
experiment, the coefficient of the dummy becomes marginally significant (p-value = 0.057), but it is still negative. 
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 For further illustration, Figure 5 represents subjects according to their deviation from the 
Bayesian prediction in the last round (in the X-axis) and variable D. The box is divided in quarters, 
and the optimistic subjects (in that round at least) are the dots in the right-hand quarters. Those in the 
lower right-hand quarter, further, indicate an interval such that D is negative, contrary to what 
Hypothesis III predicts. We can see that many optimistic subjects are placed in such quarter and, in 
any case, the value of D is rarely large for any of those subjects. 
 
Figure 5: Subject’s deviation from Bayesian prediction vs. asymmetry index D        
With respect to the second half of Hypothesis III, it basically says that intervals should be of a 
relatively larger size when f ≤ 0.5. Note first that the mean and median size of the elicited interval is 
0.223 and 0.150, respectively. More specific to our hypothesis, further, the mean and median size of 
the elicited interval is 0.179 and 0.140 among participants with  ≤    ; and 0.253 and 0.180 
respectively among participants with      . Contrary to Hypothesis III, therefore, intervals are 
larger when      , although this difference is not significant (t-test, p-value = 0.1576). For further 
detail, the dark circles in Figure 6 show the observed frequency f and the size of the elicited interval 
for each individual. Again, we observe that Hypothesis III is not satisfied, as the size of the intervals 
is larger when f is large, although the difference is not statistically significant, as we have observed. 
For comparison, Figure 6 also depicts the size of the 95 percent confidence interval of a Bayesian 
agent for each possible value of f (see the hollow circles). From this figure, it seems quite clear that 
most participants were overprecise, in the sense that their stated confidence interval were too tight 
relative to the Bayesian confidence interval. On the other hand, most underprecise individuals 
observed larger proportions of female names. We stress that similar findings have been also obtained 
25 
 
in the study by López-Pérez et al. (2020), where the elicited intervals were incentivized. This 
suggests that our results here are not an artifact of our experimental design.  
 
Figure 6: Size of the stated (dark circles) and Bayesian (hollow circles) CIs, by frequency.  
Result III: The average subject does not systematically report ‘positively skewed’ intervals 
in the last round. This is also true in particular for those subjects who overestimate θ. The size of the 
intervals does not depend on the evidence observed. 
Miscellaneous remarks 
We briefly consider here three unrelated issues. The first once concerns model of optimism 
with cognitive costs. According to the model of choice of beliefs that we have considered, based on 
AD and BP, the only cost associated to optimistic beliefs is monetary. In the last estimation, 
inaccurate beliefs reduce the chance of winning the estimation prize, which according to the model 
should alleviate the participants’ estimation bias relative to the previous rounds. Yet, as alternative 
models suggest –see, e.g. Rabin (1994)–, avoiding evidence that is easily available or repressing 
unfavorable information are cognitively costly tasks. In our experiment, participants are in fact 
compelled to observe the evidence. Further, the information provided is easily understandable and 
the sample size is quite large. Considering these factors altogether, participants may find cognitively 
hard to ignore the evidence and to get swept up in optimism. 
 In a nutshell, models of optimism with cognitive costs predict that subjects will overestimate 
θ in our experiment, but only to a limited extent, similar in all rounds. Although some of our findings 
go well in line with these predictions, the evidence overall does not seem very supporting. On the 
negative side, we find that most subjects underestimate at least in one round, i.e., the share of 
subjects who never underestimate θ is relatively small. Moreover, these optimistic subjects tend to 




















should be lower in that case. We have also seen that overestimation is somehow correlated with the 
subject’s CRT score. Is this because more reflective subjects tend to be relatively more successful in 
repressing or avoiding the negative evidence? We find this conjecture a bit puzzling. On the positive 
side, it is true that the people who inflate θ always often do it to a reduced extent: As we have seen, 
in fact, the median deviation from the Bayesian estimate among these participants amounts to 5 balls. 
Further, the introduction of a payoff for accuracy in round 3 has little or no effect on the magnitude 
of the bias, which again is favorable to these models. In this sense, the models with cognitive costs 
seem to fare relatively better than models like BP.          
A second issue that deserves some exploration concerns the intrinsic utility function that we 
have considered in Section 4.1, which depends just on the agent’s monetary gain. It might be also the 
case, though, that (some) subjects do not like to be disappointed if their beliefs point too high and the 
reality happens to be mediocre. This is somehow the opposite of anticipatory utility, in that people 
deflate their expectations, and could be particularly important in our design, where subjects learn the 
actual state of the world at the end of the experiment.
17
 To check this point, we included a test so as 
to measure a subject’s concern with disappointment and regret. Specifically, participants were asked 
to think of some experience in which their expectations had not been fulfilled. To illustrate the nature 
of the problem, we included several examples in which they could think, like their performance in a 
test, the behavior of a beloved person or the result of some bet. Then, they were asked to assess the 
following statements: (i) In this kind of situations, I tend towards anger or rage; (ii) In this kind of 
situations I tend towards sadness and/or to mull over the issue for a long time; (iii) I tend to prevent 
these situations by adjusting downwards my expectations; and (iv) When I live one of these 
situations, I find it hard to focus or think on other things. Subjects reported their agreement with each 
statement in a scale from 1 (totally disagree) to 5 (totally agree). The mean (median) answer to 
questions (i) to (iv) was, respectively, 3 (3), 3.90 (4), 3.09 (3), and 3.41 (4). When included in the 
panel data model introduced in the discussion of the evidence on Hypothesis II, these measures of 
disappointment and regret do not predict the observed bias, except for statement (iii), whose 
associated coefficient turns out to be positive and significant (0.051, p-value = 0.011). This, 
however, would mean that participants who claim to avoid disappointment by adjusting downwards 
their expectations are in fact more prone to provide less pessimistic or even optimistic estimations, 
other things being equal. Although it is unnecessary for our purposes to find an explanation for this 
paradoxical result, it might be the case that the participants’ answers to statement (iii) give 
information about their awareness of their downward bias. If so, it is plausible that those participants 
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 This is not unusual in the literature; see for instance Gotthard –Real (2017) and Barron (2020). 
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who are conscious of their bias try to correct them, therefore providing less pessimistic or even 
optimistic estimations.  
A third issue is that, to get a better insight of the participants’ heterogeneity in terms of 
optimism, we also conducted the Revised Life Orientation Test (LOT-R), a widely used instrument 
in psychology to assess the level of optimism. The LOT-R comprises ten statements and the 
respondents must indicate their agreement to each one using a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree). Three of the statements measure optimism directly, while other three statements 
measure pessimism. The four remaining statements are fillers and they are not considered in the 
calculation of the LOT-R score, which is computed as the sum of scores in the statements about 
optimism and pessimism (for the latter, the scores are previously reversed) and it is comprised 
between 6 (strongly pessimistic) and 30 (strongly optimistic). The mean and median LOT-R score 
were 20.71 and 22, respectively.
18
 When included in the panel data model introduced in the 
discussion of the evidence on Hypothesis II, neither the aggregate score or the scores of the different 
statements were found to have a significant effect on the observed bias. 
   Result IV: Models of optimism with cognitive costs are inconsistent with: (a) most of the 
participants underestimate θ at least once and (b) overestimation is more prevalent among individuals 
who observed relatively few female balls. Measures of the participants’ degree of optimism, 
pessimism and disappointment aversion hardly explain the observed biases.  
5. Conclusion 
Subjects in our experiment face a rather simple problem of inference, that is, estimating the 
mode of their posterior beliefs by extrapolation from a sample. Moreover, we have a strong control 
over the subjects’ priors and the signals they observe. While most subjects track rather closely the 
Bayesian prediction, Figure 1 shows that a fraction of them deviate. However, they tend to 
underestimate the mode, not inflate it. Further, underestimation is equally prevalent when there is no 
prize for accuracy, it is unrelated to personal characteristics like risk aversion, and subjects rarely 
report skewed confidence intervals. The preference for the state prize to be high, we conclude, hardly 
motivates deviations from Bayes’ rule in our context. Overall, the evidence is not supportive of the 
models by AD and BP, whereas models with cognitive costs are empirically more relevant, but only 
in relative terms.     
The two families of models state sufficient conditions for a positivity bias, but our findings in 
this respect are mostly negative. On one hand, models like AD and BP predict that the prevalence or 
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 The data relative to one of the statements of pessimism were corrupted for participants in the first sessions. The results 
provided correspond to the remaining subsample (n=21). 
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‘demand’ of the bias should be maximal when its price is nil or low. In our experiment, however, we 
find always a very small, arguably negligible bias. Relatedly, these models also say that the 
prevalence of the bias should decrease as its material cost increases. Our findings do not support this 
idea, at least within our payoff constellation,. Taking into account additional evidence surveyed in 
Section 2, the relation between the bias and its ‘price’, if any, seems hardly linear. While the demand 
for the bias could be further explored in a design similar to ours, but with a very large estimation 
prize, e.g., 100 euros if the estimate is accurate, we are however unconvinced that this possibility is 
worth the cost given the extremely limited ‘demand’ of optimism in our setting, where the price is 
low.
19
 On the other hand, models with cognitive costs say that the extent of the bias is a function of 
the proportion of individuals with low costs. The models are not very specific about the determinants 
of those costs, but the limited evidence for optimism that we find suggests either that (i) our sample 
was biased towards agents with high costs or (ii) cognitive costs are not so essential for the 
occurrence of optimism in our setting. Perhaps these costs are negatively related to the complexity of 
the inference problem which, arguably, was low in our experiment. This suggests a potential line of 
investigation.      
In this line, our plan for future research is to propose alternative sufficient environmental or 
personal conditions for optimism and extend our experimental design to test them. For instance, the 
models with cognitive costs are sometimes not specific about the determinants of these costs. One 
could guess however that the size of the sample and its informativeness are relevant in this regard. In 
particular, inflation might be more prevalent and acute when the sample size is small, or the 
posteriors of several beliefs are similar. For a second line of research, one of our conjectures is that 
optimism failed to appear in our setting because learning was too ‘transparent’ and hence did not 
lead to a crowd-out of attention, i.e., to a focus on those aspects of the problem that were more 
beneficial to the decider; Epley and Gilovich (2016). According to this conjecture, therefore, a 
sufficient condition for optimism is complexity coupled with incentives to pay attention on the 
stories or details most beneficial. More research is warranted. 
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 Alternatively, one could explore further whether the demand of optimism depends on how desirable the positive beliefs 
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Appendix I: Instructions for the control treatment 
Thank you for participating in this experiment on Behavioral and Experimental Economics. You will 
be paid some money at its end; the precise amount will depend on chance and your decisions. All 
your decisions will be confidential, that is, the other participants will not get any information about 
your decisions, nor do you get any information about the others’ decisions. In addition, your 
decisions will be anonymous: during the experiment, you will not have to enter your name at any 
time. 
Decisions are made via the keyboard of your computer terminal. Read the on-screen instructions 
carefully before making any decision; there is no hurry to decide. These instructions meet the basic 
standards in Experimental Economics; in particular, all the information that appears in them is true 
and therefore there is no deception. 
Please, do not talk to any other participant. If you do not follow this rule, we will have to exclude 
you from the experiment without payment. If you have questions, raise your hand and we will assist 
you. The use of calculators and writing tools is not permitted. Please, switch off your cell phone. 
 
 
There is a ‘virtual urn’ with 100 balls. Each ball has written a different name of girl or boy; any of 
these names is used with a relatively high frequency in Spain. Let us call F the actual number of balls 
with a female name in your urn. You do not know either F or the number of balls in your urn with 
boy name (that is, 100 – F). You only know that the value of F has been randomly selected by the 
computer from among all integers between 0 and 100, both included (this means a total of 101 
numbers, as 0 is included as well). Therefore, the probability that one of these potential values of F 
has been chosen is a priori of 1/101, that is, slightly less than 1%. Important: The value of F will not 
change throughout the experiment; the urn has always the same content. 
During the experiment, the computer will perform several extractions from the urn, randomly and 
with replacement ‒in other words: each draw is reintroduced into the urn and can therefore be drawn 
in the next extraction. Each of the 100 balls has the same chance in each extraction. The computer 
will show you the name written in each extraction, one by one. Between some of the extractions, you 
will receive instructions to complete some questionnaire of perform some task. 
Once you have completed all questionnaires and tasks, you will be paid in private and in cash. In this 
regard, you will receive 3 Euros for participating in the experiment, plus an additional payment that 
will depend of three ‘prizes’. Prize 1: you receive 0.50 Euros for each ball in your urn with a girl 




name. In other words, if there are F balls with female name in the urn, this prize equals 0.5 x F. Prize 
2 will be explained later, but will depend on one of the tasks to be performed. The same can be said 
about prize 3. Important: You can only win either prize 1 or prize 2. You do not know now which of 
them you will win; this will be determined randomly at the end of the experiment, choosing then one 
of the two prizes with a 50% probability. On the contrary, winning prize 3 is compatible with 
winning either prize 1 or 2. Observe finally that the prizes are always independent of each other. For 
example, what you win with prize 3 will not depend on how you have performed in the task 
corresponding to prize 2, and vice versa. 
 





Examples of screenshots 
 
Screenshot for the third estimation task, i.e., the incentivized one 
 
 
Screenshot for the control questions 
Note: In the last two questions in this screenshot, the respective numbers of balls with girl and boy name in the urn were 
determined randomly for each subject; the selected numbers could be any multiple of 10 between 0 and 100, so as to 




Appendix II: Additional data 
 
Observed frequency First estimation Second estimation Third estimation 
[0, 0.2) 0,154 0,138 0,127 
[0.2, 0.4) 0,024 -0,055 -0,042 
[0.4, 0.6) -0,085 -0,061 -0,079 
[0.6, 0.8) -0,015 -0,018 -0,008 
[0.8, 1) -0,174 -0,146 -0,127 
Aggregated -0,066 -0,054 -0,048 




Appendix III: Proofs 
Proposition II. If    , then any subjective belief such that     coincides with the objective mode 
    is optimal. 
Proof: if    , Abel chooses beliefs that maximize 
 
 
                     . Since     is the 
objective probability of the subjective mode, and it is maximized when the subjective mode 
coincides with the objective mode, any distribution of subjective probabilities such that         is 
optimal. ∎ 
Proposition III. If     , then the optimal beliefs are characterized by        for    = 1 and        
for any     . 
Proof: if     , Abel chooses beliefs that maximize 
 
 
                 . It is straightforward that 
this expression is maximized for beliefs such that        for    = 1 and        for any     . ∎ 
Proposition IV. The optimal subjective mode    
  is at least equal to the objective mode. If   
   further, optimal beliefs are characterized by        for any       
 . 
Proof: consider subjective beliefs (A) such that           ,       and        (   ). Now 
consider beliefs (B), identical to (A) except by the fact that       and        so that         (if 
    and there are hence multiple modes, condition         means that the estimate chosen in 




                        
 
 
               
which holds for any       , since        and    . Therefore, the optimal subjective mode 
cannot be lower than    . For the second part of the proposition, consider beliefs such that       
for some state       . If Abel transfers all the subjective probability from state    to    , his 




                             
which holds necessarily since        and   > 0. Therefore, any beliefs such that       for any 
state        are suboptimal. ∎ 
Proposition V. Consider beliefs with subjective mode      If                  , a necessary 
(but not sufficient) condition for these beliefs to be optimal is that they  assign       to any 
      .  
Proof: the proof of Proposition IV above shows that it is not optimal to assign strictly positive 
probability to any rate lower than    . Assume now, without loss of generality, that the posteriors 
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assign strictly positive probability to some states larger than     (if any) and in particular to the 
largest state, i.e.,      in our experiment. Consider also posteriors (B), identical to (A) except that 
some probability mass     is transferred from      to    . Taking (3) into account, the expected 
utility of (B) will be higher than that of (A) if 
            –                                                  
While condition (4) is obtained given a transfer from      to    , it also ensures that a transfer of 
probability from any state between   and     (if any) to     improves Abel’s utility. If (4) holds, 
therefore, Abel is better if he concentrates the probability mass in    , instead of spreading part of it 
among some larger states (keeping at the same time the mode in    ). ∎  
Corollary 1: If                  , Abel assigns all the probability mass to one single rate. Its 
specific value depends on the curvature of the utility function of money, u(x), but also on  . In 
particular, Abel is Bayesian, i.e.,          if   is low enough or if the utility of money increases at 
a sufficiently lower rate than the posterior beliefs (as we move towards the objective mode). 
Proof: Proposition IV says that, in the optimum, the subjective mode must be some rate between     
and 1. When condition (4) is satisfied for     =    , therefore, Abel’s optimal beliefs must 
necessarily concentrate all the mass in some rate. It follows that the optimal beliefs, i.e., the value of 
   
 , can be determined by comparing the utility of the potential degenerate distributions. For 
example, it turns out that a probability distribution with the whole mass in     is optimal if  
                                                    
Rearranging terms, this can be expressed as  
       
                 
    
                              
which holds true as far as   is low enough and/or the utility of money increases at a sufficiently 
lower rate than the posterior beliefs (as we move towards the objective mode). ∎ 
Proposition VI. Consider beliefs with subjective mode     such that                  . 
Conditional on risk aversion, a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for these beliefs to be optimal 
is that they assign evenly as much probability as possible to some of the largest state(s), subject to 
         for any   .  
Proof: consider again beliefs (A) and (B), described in the proof of Proposition V. For the sake of 
the exposition, assume     <  , so that the probability mass is not entirely assigned to     . If 
                 , we have shown that Abel is better by transferring some probability from 
    to      or in fact from any    such that     <     , at least as far as     remains the only 
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subjective mode (or the one selected as an estimate in period 2 if there are several modes). A relevant 
question is therefore if it can be optimal to transfer all probability to     , and the answer is not 
affirmative in general. To check this point, it suffices to compare the expected utility of two 
degenerate beliefs: one where all the probability mass is in     <  , and another where the mass is 




            
 
 
        
 
 
                
 
 
           
that is, if 
                             
which is not necessarily true under our conditions, because   can be low and        large relative 
to         θ     which depends on the curvature of the utility function. Although we cannot 
find a closed-form solution for    
 , hence, we can at least say that it can be lower than 1 in some 
circumstances, and the probability mass will be in that case spread. One possibility is that optimal 
beliefs entail subjective probabilities          and         (if Abel expects      to be chosen in 
period 2, he should assign infinitesimally less probability to     ). Alternatively, Abel might find 
optimal to assign some positive probability   also to the second largest state       . In fact, this is 





























        
 
 
     
 
 
      
That is, if 
         
 
 
                    
We are assuming that Abel transfers the same mass of probability from the subjective mode and the 
largest state to the second largest state. Note that Abel can never be better off by transferring 
probability from the largest state only. However, given the previous probabilities          and 
       , the restriction that the subjective mode is unchanged implies that the probability must be 
transferred in the same amount from     and the largest state. We can generalize the last condition 
so that Abel will assign positive probability to the n-th largest state    if 
    
           
   
   
 
 
 
